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ABSTRACT
Porter, Jeremy. M.S.C.S., Department of Computer Science and Engineering, Wright State Univer-
sity, 2019. Detecting Malicious Behavior in OpenWrt with QEMU Tracing.
In recent years embedded devices have become more ubiquitous than ever before and
are expected to continue this trend. Embedded devices typically have a singular or more
focused purpose, a smaller footprint, and often interact with the physical world. Some
examples include routers, wearable heart rate monitors, and thermometers. These devices
are excellent at providing real time data or completing a specific task quickly, but they lack
many features that make security issues more obvious.
Generally, Embedded devices are not easily secured. Malware or rootkits in the firmware
of an embedded system are difficult to detect because embedded devices do not have the
usual human interfaces such as a keyboard, video, or a mouse. Traditional rootkits typically
come in three variants: binary, library, and kernel. Binary rootkits aim to replace a binary
file in the operating system such as ls (list files) or cd (change directory). Library rootkits
replace system libraries with malicious code that can intercept system calls and provide
incomplete or false information as it is relayed between user and kernel spaces. Kernel
rootkits hook directly into the kernel and provide false or incomplete information to sys-
tem calls. Kernel rootkits are often loadable kernel modules (LKM) that can be installed
at run time. Typically, countermeasures and detection methods require specific security
hardware tools or scanning the system in a traditional way with some interactive input-
s/outputs provided to an end user or security researcher. These methods don’t work well
with embedded devices that lack additional security hardware and a keyboard, video, or
mouse to display or interact. A more tailored and focused approach is required for embed-
ded devices. This thesis takes a step toward building a framework for embedded device
security auditing. The first component of this framework is a malicious router, the sec-
ond component is QEMU used to trace the execution of the malicious router. An example
iii
OpenWrt router with malicious behavior is demonstrated. The system consists of a client, a
router, and a server. The router contains MITM Proxy software used to monitor and modify
HTTP requests. The client uses wget and the server uses uhttpd to simulate an HTTP
request/response scenario. The router is able to inject/modify HTTP requests and provide
a response different than what the server would provide.
The second component, QEMU with tracing is explored and shown to be an effective
measure to provide truthful data with respect to the operation of the malicious router. We
believe this framework is a flexible paradigm for examining embedded device firmware.
QEMU offers multiple tracing methods with more granular data as required.
In conclusion, we propose a two part detection method for detecting rootkits in embed-
ded devices. The first part, a suspect system demonstrated by a router that performs HTTP
injection and a second part that uses QEMU to trace the execution of the suspect system
with some level of trust. We discuss some additional malicious systems that can be used
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Introduction
In recent years there has been an explosion of Internet of Things (IoT) devices [19].
While these devices provide valuable real-time data, remote control capabilities and secu-
rity features, the security of the IoT device is often challenging to verify. These devices
often lack traditional input/output mechanisms of a normal computer, but they have many
of the same networking interfaces.
To rectify this problem, we propose a possible solution to analyzing firmware for
malicious activity. Specifically, we examine the case of HTTP injection through OpenWrt,
an open source Linux-based router firmware. Our goal is to work through some of the
challenges to emulating the Linux kernel directly and providing analysis. We develop
context for examining maliciously modified firmware with a bias toward rootkits within
embedded firmware.
1.1 Motivation
With the increasing number of IoT devices and attackers looking to monetize opportu-
nities, there is no shortage of security breaches due to poor security in embedded devices.
Before we explore the technical aspects of embedded device security, let’s examine the
sources of malicious firmware. 1
There are at least three sources of malicious firmware, 1) traditional malware devel-
1This section is adapted from a previous publication [31].
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opers, 2) manufacturer developed, 3) and state sponsored. With continued reliance on
technology for basic services, such as health care, military protection, and electrical power,
the threat of an attack utilizing malicious firmware is growing.
Malware developers are often looking for monetary gain. Controlling a users system
can be one step in a larger scheme to steal large amounts of money, resources, or other
goods. Malware developers are working on long term attacks, which will give hackers an
ongoing and virtually undetectable access to the target system [22, p. 126].
If monetizing is the goal, hardware and device manufactures can do it readily. Manufacturer-
sponsored rootkits are being developed. Lenovo created a piece of software called Lenovo
Service Engine. This software installed Lenovo based update tools directly from the BIOS.
The BIOS actually copies an autochk.exe that runs every time the Windows platform boots.
Autochk.exe then creates the LenovoUpdate.exe and Lenovochk.exe binary files. Regard-
less of whether the drive is wiped or OS reinstalled, the behavior persists [12]. Manufac-
turers are not always trustworthy, and this is the case with Lenovo. Early in 2015, they
were responsible for the SuperFish man-in-the-middle root certificate issue. This allowed
Lenovo to monitor all user web traffic as well as inject advertisements of their choosing
into the browser [24].
In 2013, Edward Snowden released thousands of U.S. intelligence documents. Analy-
sis of the documents suggests that the National Security Agency (NSA) developed malware
called EquationDrug and GrayFish that obtains a payload code from the Internet to flash
the existing hard drive firmware. Kaspersky researchers stated that this particular malware
surpasses anything else they have seen [42].
With malware developers looking for new targets and smaller footprints, manufactur-
ers behaving less than trustworthy, and the advent of state sponsored malware an apparent
reality, now more than ever there is a need for better detection and prevention of firmware




In this section, we identify several key concepts and definitions used throughout this
paper. We define firmware, rootkits and IoT devices. We will build and explore on these
concepts in throughout the paper.
Firmware is a piece of software that runs directly on computer component hardware.
For example, the motherboard has a Basic Input Output System (BIOS) which manages
features and functionality of the motherboard and interacts with attached hardware. The
hard drive, graphics-processing unit (GPU), and the processor itself all have firmware that
interact with and control hardware resources. This firmware is operating system for the
embedded device.
A rootkit is a malicious piece of software that is able to hide itself from detection.
It can perform malicious activities such as exfiltration of data, key logging, or allowing
a backdoor to an operating system [33]. Firmware rootkits are a special type of rootkit
that modify the firmware. This type of rootkit can overwrite the firmware and maintain
persistence and thwart detection in similar ways that standard rootkits do.
Before further exploration of embedded or IoT devices, we will describe an existing
definition of embedded systems. IoT is an easy term to use, but for the remainder of
this paper we will use embedded system to describe this class of devices. Specifically,
embedded systems [18, pp. 3-4]:
• are a component of a more complex system
• perform a specific task
• have a small footprint (they have smaller storage/memory requirements)
• consume less power
• have specially designed operating systems
3
• interact with the physical world
• are single board computers
While these characteristics are not conclusive, they are indicative of a specific group
of devices. Embedded systems often have limited inputs and outputs and often interact in
unique ways. For example, the OpenWrt router system used in this research project is not
generally connected to a monitor, mouse, or keyboard. There is no obvious way to examine
the firmware for security problems.
1.3 Problem Statement
Embedded systems are nearly ubiquitous. Internet of things (IoT) devices are show-
ing up in consumer devices and industrial control systems. Intel claims that IoT devices
accounted for 2 billion devices in 2006 and are projected to account for 200 billion in 2020
[19].
Embedded device security is challenging. With the number of IoT devices, it’s prac-
tically impossible to secure them all. These devices are designed to connect easily and
provide almost instant data with little to no user interaction. There is no easy detection
when a security issue occurs.
There are many examples of exploited embedded devices in the news. One example,
reported by Lee Mathews in 2017 involved a casino that was attacked via an Internet con-
nected thermometer. The attackers exfiltrated 10 gigabytes of data to servers in Finland.
The data exfiltration was the suspicious component. Traffic to and from the thermometer
was normal [27].
These kind of incidents are all too common. Researchers have shown interest and
provided some possible solutions. Firmadyne [3] is one such solution. Firmadyne is a
framework for dynamic analysis of embedded Linux firmware. It scales well and provides
4
a detailed analysis of large numbers of firmware in an automated manner. Firmadyne uses
a modified Linux kernel to complete the task. It provides analysis on the root file system
of the firmware rather than the Linux kernel. Thus, rootkits are more challenging to detect
with this tool. Another solution presented by Costin, et. al. [6] shows very similar behavior
to Firmadyne. The problem with these two approaches is that the kernel is not emulated.
Without kernel emulation it is not easy to understand the behavior of that kernel and the
state of it’s security.
Examining an embedded system for rootkits or general security is difficult. Some of
the tools and methods include using file signatures or specialized security hardware. These
methods are explored further in chapter 2.
Rootkits are more difficult to detect than typical malware because they hide their own
malicious code from detection [7, p. 296]. Firmware rootkits have characteristics that make
them nearly impossible to remove and even more difficult to detect than traditional rootkits.
Firmware rootkits can be persistent across system reboots and operating system upgrades
or reinstallation. Forensic analysis can easily overlook firmware rootkits [26].
Firmware rootkits can also go a step further and remain undetected by traditional tech-
niques because most of these techniques do not validate the hardware state [7]. Firmware
based rootkits are even more difficult to detect than standard rootkits that run on the oper-
ating system. Normal forensic investigations often overlook firmware rootkits. Techniques
for detection are not widely available and mostly academic in nature [26].
There are two straight forward approaches to examining firmware for trustworthiness.
First, the binary data can be analyzed with static analysis. While this method can uncover
issues, it can be very challenging to examine large pieces of code without an understanding
of the behavior. The second method, is dynamic analysis. This means the code is running
and the behavior is examined. With this approach the embedded firmware must run inside a
container. The firmware cannot be trusted to provide an accurate representation of it’s own
behavior. With the firmware running in a virtualization container, the executed instructions
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can be examined.
In this thesis we aim to provide a specific method of examining the kernel of an em-
bedded operating system. Instead of traditional methods, we propose the use of emulation
tools to emulate the Linux kernel and examine it’s behavior for malicious code. Other
methodologies such as Firmadyne look at web interfaces or software installed on the de-
vice that resides in a file system. Our method uses QEMU as an emulation engine to run
a specially crafted OpenWrt firmware. Further, we can trace execution of the firmware in-
struction by instruction. QEMU tracing is a pragmatic approach that provides a systematic
approach to examining CPU instructions, network traffic, and various system calls without
impacting these systems directly.
1.4 Organization
The rest of this paper is organized as follows: Chapter 2 provides a more thorough ex-
amination of rootkits and their variants. Chapter 3 introduces the build process of OpenWrt
with MITM Proxy installed. This is an example piece of firmware that can be analyzed in a
QEMU virtualization container. Chapter 4 demonstrates HTTP injection and modification.
Methodologies for instruction tracing and actual rootkit injection are discussed. Finally
Chapter 5, concludes and discusses future work.
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A Background of Rootkits and Detection
2.1 Three Types of Rootkits
Binary Rootkits Binary rootkits replace critical system binary files. Binary rootkits pro-
vide an attacker remote access, local access, and are useful for evidence hiding. As an
example of a binary rootkit, administrative tools or common Linux based daemons could
be rewritten with malicious code and distributed to unsuspecting users or administrators.
Installing these malicious tools would install a rootkit and replace system binary files such
as grep, ls, or login. Binary rootkits use simple hiding techniques and can be detected via
integrity checking tools [4, p. 10].
Kernel Rootkits Kernel level rootkits hook into the kernel and replace system calls.
These rootkits operate at the kernel level and therefore can provide faulty information to
user and OS thereby hiding themselves. This type of rootkit operates using a loadable
kernel module (LKM). The LKM operates at the kernel level and modifies system calls
with custom malicious code. The mitigation for kernel rootkits is to disable loading kernel
modules [4, p. 13].
As an alternative to modifying the kernel, the system image in memory can be modi-
fied to change the system calls. For example, the rootkit called SucKit allows covert remote
login to a target system and does not require any kernel modules [4, pp. 12-13].
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Library Rootkits Library rootkits replace a standard system library that relays informa-
tion between kernel space and user space. The t0rn rootkit uses libproc.a to accomplish
this task. The libproc.a library sanitizes results from the kernel. When a user requests
a directory listing or process list, these can be falsified. To mitigate this an administrator
can look directly at the /proc file system. Additionally, information can be relayed from a
malicious library to the kernel. In other words, false information can be fed into the kernel.
Any application linked to the library will report falsely. However, statically linked appli-
cations are not affected. Another method is to modify /etc/ld.so.preload placing
the custom library before other system libraries that redirects standard calls to ensure ma-
licious calls will execute in place of regular calls. Linux tools such as ltrace, strace, ltruss
can trace library and system calls to detect this behavior [4, pp. 13-14].
The standard rootkits listed above have relatively well defined detection techniques.
Firmware rootkits use similar techniques as standard rootkits. Firmware rooktits differ in
where they are stored. Firmware rootkits infect and hide within firmware and therefore
are persistent across reboots, system upgrades and reinstallation. Furthermore, removal
of such a rootkit involves replacing the infected firmware, replacing the affected hardware
or replacing the entire system hardware. Detecting a firmware rootkit can be particularly
challenging because they do not reside within the operating system. The typical detection
techniques do not apply here [41].
2.2 Rootkit Detection and Mitigation
2.2.1 Traditional Rootkit Detection
Existing rootkit detection techniques and their effectiveness are outlined by Campbell,
et. al. [7, p. 307] These methods include file integrity, platform integrity and kernel
integrity checking. Additionally, examining file signatures and physical memory can be
8
used to uncover rootkits.
2.2.2 File/Disk Integrity Checks
Integrity comes in three variations: file integrity, platform integrity, and kernel in-
tegrity. File integrity is very simple in that periodically checks the hashes of given files to
ensure they have not changed. One tool that provides file integrity checks is Tripwire [7, p.
305].
2.2.3 Platform Integrity Checks (TPM)
Trusted Platform Module can provide platform integrity during boot using Platform
Configuration Registers (PCRs) to store checksums of firmware. These checksum can be
compared against current values to looking for modifications. [7, p. 306].
2.2.4 Runtime Kernel Integrity Checks
Runtime integrity check can be done using checksums of kernel code and immutable
data. This is also possible with specialized hardware such as CoPilot, a PCI card that can
read kernel memory via DMA. Performance counters on the processor can also be used to
check the integrity of the kernel [7, p. 306].
2.2.5 File/Disk Signature Checks
Signature checking is simply looking for known malware based on signatures. This is
heavily dependent on an up to date database of signatures. One example of software that
uses signature check is chkrootkit [7, p. 306].
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2.2.6 Physical Memory Signature Checks
Aside from file and disk, memory can be scanned for known signatures. Specialized
hardware can be used to accomplish this to avoid reliance on the kernel. Hardware provides
the advantage of being able to check the entire memory space [7, p. 306].
David, Chan et al. noted that their proof of concept rootkit cloaker was very effective
at bypassing most existing detection approaches [7, p. 307]. These methods are insufficient
to detect a firmware rootkit because embedded devices do not have mechanisms to provide
the kind of data expected.
2.3 Firmware Rootkit Taxonomy
This section discusses different types of firmware rootkits. Each type discussed is
listed below.
• BIOS
• Hard Drive Firmware
• GPU Firmware
• System Management Mode
• PCI Expansion ROM
• Internet of Things Device Firmware
2.3.1 BIOS
The BIOS is stored on an EEPROM chip on the motherboard of a system. The BIOS
settings are stored in CMOS (Complementary Metal Oxide Semiconductor). BIOS based
rootkits have been around for several years. Only in the last few years have they been
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used to infect computers on a larger scale. John Heasman presented at Blackhat Europe
in 2006 regarding BIOS based rootkits. He indicated some of the key features of firmware
based rootkits, such as persistence over reboots, low footprint on disk, ability to reinfect
installations of new/same OS, and the difficulty with detecting and removing BIOS based
rootkits. Heasmans rootkit leverages the Advanced Configuration Power Interface (ACPI)
to create a backdoor to both Windows NT and Linux based operating systems [17].
One of the earliest known BIOS attacks was called the CIH virus. CIH surfaced in
June 1998 and simply erased the BIOS of the affected system. While this is not a rootkit, it
was successful in disabling the system and notable in that the system BIOS can be modified
[11]. The first BIOS based rootkit called Mebromi surfaced in 2011. Mebromi is much
more advanced, though still lacks some functionality [13].
Giuliani argues that the complexity of BIOS rootkits means that they will not be much
of a threat [13]. However, a modern BIOS rootkit developed by an Italian security group
known as Hacking Team shows that it is still a viable attack. It appears from analysis that
physical access to the target is required to infect the system. However, this rootkit actually
behaves similar to the Lenovo rootkit described above. It simply ensures a specific service
(Remote Control System) is installed [25].
2.3.2 Countermeasures
Heasman, at the time of his presentation in 2006, suggests that existing tools such
as VICE, Blacklight, and RootkitRevealer can be used to detect BIOS based rootkits [16].
Implicitly, this must be based on the changes that are made to the operating system files,
memory, etc. Secondly, Heasman suggests operating system event logs and auditing re-
garding ACPI to detect the proof of concept he presented [17]. These methods seem less
than ideal, but at the time they were all that was available.
The more modern UEFI rootkit developed by Hacking Team has a more formal de-
tection method provided by Intel. The Intel tool is called CHIPSEC [21]. According to
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the GitHub website, CHIPSEC is a framework for analyzing the security of PC platforms
including hardware, system firmware (BIOS/UEFI), and platform components [20]. In a
CanSecWest 2014 presentation, Intel researchers presented CHIPSEC and detailed a num-
ber of its features, including the ability to verify SMRAM is locked [20].
2.3.3 Hard Drive Firmware
Before understanding how to detect and mitigate hard drive firmware, it is instructive
to have a brief overview of the components of a hard drive with respect to this topic. The
main focus will be on the electronic components on the PCB (Printed Circuit Board). For
reference, there is a picture with callouts below. [8]
Figure 2.1: Hard drive controller
Some clever reverse engineers have done some work to document how the hard disk
controller works. It seems that the hard disk controller supports JTAG (Joint Test Action
Group). JTAG is an interface used for debugging and programming processors. With
this information, it is possible to control a controller. It is possible to start, stop, modify
12
Table 2.1: Hard drive controller component descriptions
Part Notes
DRAM DRAM ranges from approximately 8 MB to 64 MB and is
the cache for the hard drive.
Spindle motor The spindle motor controller drives the motor on the hard
drive.
Serial flash Serial flash ranges from 64 KB to 256 KB and stores the
program that disk controller boots from.
Hard disk con-
troller
The hard disk controller is made by various manufacturers
(Marvell, ST, LSI). Some HDD manufacturers make their
own. These parts are not well documented.
memory, and set breakpoints. Furthermore, it is possible to dump out the boot ROM of the
controller in using the serial port [8].
The attack as it stands is not very practical. An attacker would need physical ac-
cess and a significant amount of time to reverse engineer a specific hard drive, modify the
firmware, and reflash the firmware. However, after gaining some basic understanding of
how the controller operates it is possible to skip the JTAG interface all together and directly
use the serial flash on the PCB. Simply rewriting the code on the serial flash is sufficient.
This too is not very practical, but it does provide the benefit of persistence. The rewritten
code will run every time the hard drive boots up [8].
The step that makes this firmware attack practical is understanding the hard drive
manufacturers have already made a software tool to reflash the firmware. It is also possible
to hide data in service areas on the hard drive [1]. Another set of tools called idle3-tools[2]
can be used to modify the hard drive behavior. The idle3-tools code can be modified to
actually flash the firmware of the HD. At this point the attack is feasible [8]. All that is
required is access to the hard drive. This may not be trivial to obtain, but a malicious
supplier or vendor could readily modify hard drives this way. Or more likely, a malicious
party with access to the manufacturer could inject their own code into the firmware.
Now that it is possible to modify this firmware in a feasible manner, the question is
what can be done with this? One example is to wait until a machine reads the /etc/shadow
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file where passwords are stored on Linux systems. The contents of the file could modified
to include something preconfigured and thus an attacker could log on to the machine unin-
hibited [8].
2.3.4 Countermeasures
Some of the suggested mitigation techniques are applicable to most rootkit detection
methods. Simply verifying the operating system integrity is the most obvious technique.
But this kind of rootkit need not modify the operating system to be effective. It may also
be productive to check network traffic for data exfiltration [40, pp. 48-51].
More specific methods to detect HDD firmware rootkits include reading data from the
hard drive after a write occurs and verify the integrity. Another method is through remote
attestation as indicated by the Trusted Computing Group [40, pp. 48-51].
2.3.5 GPU
There are at least three examples of GPU based malware at present: jellyfish, Demon
Keylogger, and WIN JELLY. A brief discussion of these three pieces of malware follows.
2.3.6 jellyfish
According to the GitHub page where the ”jellyfish” code resides,
”Jellyfish is a Linux based userland gpu rootkit proof of concept project utilizing the
LD PRELOAD technique from Jynx (CPU), as well as the OpenCL API developed by
Khronos group (GPU). [] some advantages of gpu stored memory:
• No GPU malware analysis tools available on web
• Can snoop on CPU host memory via DMA
• GPU can be used for fast/swift mathematical calculations like xor’ing or parsing
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• Stub/signature generation
• Malicious memory may be retained across warm reboots. (Did more conductive
research on the theory of malicious memory still being in GPU after shutdown)” [23]
At this point in time, no formal academic analysis of the proof of concept jellyfish rootkit is
available. However, one article claims that jellyfish can be used to implement a keylogger
with minimal GPU utilization–approximately 0.1%. This small usage is difficult to detect
from normal behavior. Further, jellyfish can use direct memory access (DMA) to snoop
on system memory. DMA allows direct access without involving the processor, further
complicating detection of this kind of malware.
2.3.7 Demon Keylogger
Demon keylogger is a keylogger implemented in jellyfish. This keylogger is described
by Ladakis, Koromilas, Vasiliadis, et. al. According to their paper, this is the first presen-
tation of a GPU based keylogger as presented in April of 2013. They claim that their
keylogger can capture all keystrokes with minimal overhead and no disruption to normal
graphics processing [23, p. 1]
2.3.8 WIN JELLY
WIN JELLY is remote access toolkit (RAT) [14]. The source code is available on
GitHub. As with the other mutations of jellyfish there no formal academic analysis of this
code was found. As the name indicates, this software runs on the Microsoft Windows
platform whereas the initial implementation of jellyfish was Linux based.
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2.3.9 Countermeasures
Most of the standard methods apply to CPU architecture only and are not effective
against GPU based malware [23, p. 4]. Further, there are few tools for forensics analysis
of GPU malware [35].
Runtime detection. One method is to use DMA analysis. This type of analysis is
looking for attacks that include bulk DMA transfers. However, not all GPU based malware
does this kind of transfer. Another possible defense is to profile the GPU usage and access
patterns. Presumably, under normal operation a baseline profile will be different than one
that includes malware.
Aside from the countermeasures mentioned by Ladakis, Koromilas, et. al. no GPU
specific countermeasures were found during the research for this paper. However, McAfee
Labs rebuts the dangers of GPU based rootkits. According to McAfee Labs, there are four
main points with respect to GPU based rootkits and malware:
• CPU host memory access from the GPU.
• Subsequent deletion of CPU host files.
• Persistence across warm reboots.
• Absence of GPU analysis tools.
The first claim regarding CPU host memory access from the GPU requires physical
memory be mapped to the GPU. Unprivileged code is constrained ”to memory mapped to
a process’s virtual address space, making ring 0 access a requirement” [28, p. 27]. If this
is in fact the case then this kind of mapping is more difficult than it seems.
Further, once code is running on the GPU, the installation files for that code can be
deleted. On Windows platforms, this will cause a Timeout Detection and Recover process
to initiate. Although this value is configurable, any modification is considered suspicious
and anti-malware could detect this behavior. Additionally, GPU code that runs for a long
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period may cause an unresponsive GUI on Windows and other platforms as well. In the case
of multiple GPUs or systems with not visual interaction (monitor) this may go unnoticed
[28, p. 27].
As for persistence, McAfee Labs claims that code is stored on the GPU but it is not
executing. Thus, in this case persistence refers to stored code retrieved from GPU memory
and executed in user mode on the system. Therefore, the malicious code executing outside
of the GPU can be detected using traditional malware techniques [28, p. 28].
McAfee confirms there is a lack of GPU analysis tools. However, some articles men-
tion a tool called ”JellyScan” as well as research being conducted by Dr. Golden G. Richard
III.1 At this time, there is no specific information about this tool or other forensic analysis
tools of GPU hardware.
However, in a paper on GPU-Assisted Malware the authors contradict some of the
claims that McAfee Labs makes. They write that code can be statically linked with the
CUDA library to make self-contained malware. Additionally, GPU code execution does
not require root privileges–it will run in user mode [38, pp. 290-291].
2.3.10 PCI Expansion ROM Rootkits
Another unique way to store a rootkit is in a peripheral PCI card within the system.
These cards have some flashable ROM and therefore are candidates for storing malware
[16, p. 4]. During a system boot, a system interrupt can be hooked allowing arbitrary code
on a PCI ROM to be executed. At this point, an attacker has control of the system [16].
2.3.11 Countermeasures
Since the rootkit does not rely on memory that cannot be accessed in kernel mode
and it uses the system processor (rather than ones on the PCI cards), the best detection
1See http://www.cs.uno.edu/ golden/gpu-malware-research.html
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is looking at the modifications the rootkit has made to the system structures. Traditional
methods may work well here. A second detection method is to audit the ROM. Heasman
documents steps taken to obtain the contents of ROM and provides several characteristics
of potentially malicious code in PCI ROM [16, p. 11].
Preventative measures for PCI ROM rootkits include a write protect switch available
on some PCI cards and Trusted Platform Module. A traditional write protect switch sim-
ply prevents the ROM from being written. Trusted Platform Module (TPM) may also be
a mitigation for PCI ROM rootkits. TPM actually works by building a Core Root of Trust
Measurement (CRTM). This core is configured on a new system or a trusted system with
its existing configuration. The TPM takes hash values of the ROM code in the PCI cards at
this point and stores them. During a normal system boot with TPM these hash values are
verified for change [16, p. 13]. While this will thwart a new piece of malware from infect-
ing an existing PCI ROM, it does not verify an unknown PCI ROM. The other problem with
TPM is that there is no validation of hardware from the manufacturer. If the manufacturer
supplies hardware already infected with malware, TPM will not mitigate this.
2.3.12 System Management Mode (SMM) Rootkits
Intel architecture defines four processor modes: Real Mode, Virtual-8086 Mode, Pro-
tected Mode, and System Management Mode. Real mode and Virtual-8086 mode are
legacy modes. Real mode has a 20 bit addressable memory space and provides no hard-
ware memory protection. Modern operating systems run in 32-bit or 64-bit protected mode.
Protected mode adds support for paging, memory protection, and multi-tasking. System
management mode is a mode on Intel processors for low-level hardware control. Code at
this level is not be preempted, does not have privilege levels, and does not honor memory
protection. [10, p. 1593]. (This all needs verified with Intel architecture docs)
System Management Mode has a memory space to operate in called SMRAM. This
holds the processor state, the SMI (System Management Interrupt) handler, and SMI han-
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dler data. Intel identifies three locations for SMRAM: Compatible, High Memory, and Top
of Memory Segment. The compatible region is the default location. Usually, SMRAM is
only accessible by code, executing in SMM. The other two areas, High Memory and Top of
Memory Segment extend SMM from a usual 128K to 256K of memory. When the proces-
sor receives a System Management Mode Interrupt, it enters System Management Mode
[10, p. 1593].
To install a SMM Based Rootkit (SMBR) code must be written to the SMM handler
area of SMRAM. The code must also be able to intercept system events and control ex-
ecution of the system. There are three criteria to install a SMM handler: I/O port access
privileges, access to map physical memory, and SMRAM must not be locked by the BIOS
or the operating system software [10, p. 1593]. A SMBR proof of concept is able to pro-
vide an attacker key logging and data exfiltration [10, p. 1598]. SMBR provide stealth as
they do not operate with caching or paging and therefore do not impact cache or translation
lookaside buffer (TLB)[10, p. 1603].
2.3.13 Countermeasures
SMM rootkits are much more difficult to detect since they do not need to modify
the operating system. This renders traditional heuristic methods useless. SMM rootkits
also conceal memory footprints therefore signature based detection is not feasible [10, pp.
1603-1604].
To detect SMM rootkits there are two possible solutions suggested by Embleton,
Sparks, and Zou: indirect detection and timing. Based on the SMM rootkit proof of con-
cept produced from their work, the processor timestamp is updated while code executes in
SMM. Therefore checking the timestamp before and after a SMI may provide a method of
detection. However, SMM rootkits can modify the timestamp before passing control to the
operating system [10, pp. 1603-1604].
Indirect detection encompasses cache and TLB discrepancies. SMM rootkits can re-
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side in uncached memory and they do not rely on paging therefore, these indirect methods
are not useful here. Another option is to use another device that has access to physical
memory to perform detection. In existing architecture, SMRAM is not accessible to the
system bus [10, p. 1603-1604]. This kind of method would require a hardware architecture
modification. Lastly, the IOAPIC table contains a list of interrupts that have been rerouted.
The SMM rootkit does use rerouting, but there are legitimate uses of rerouting as well such
as legacy support for USB mouse and keyboard devices.
The authors Embleton, Sparks, and Zou suggest that focus be put on prevention rather
than detection. If manufacturers secure the SMRAM register in the system BIOS this type
of rootkit can be thwarted. Additionally, operating systems may lock the SMRAM register
during the early boot phases. A third party anti-malware vendor could write a kernel driver
to lock the SMRAM register during boot. It is not easy to guarantee that this driver will
load before a malicious driver. As noted earlier, there is a tool to by Intel to check for
SMRAM locking [20].
2.3.14 Internet of Things Rootkits
The Internet of Things (IoT) refers to devices that have Internet connectivity but are
not necessarily traditional hosts. This category includes but is not limited to smart TVs,
home automation devices, VoIP phones, and routers. In a recent study Costin, Zarras, and
Francillon built a cloud based framework to validate the framework of these devices. They
found approximately 10% of the firmware tested had some form of vulnerability [6, p.
1]. While the authors do not explicitly state these vulnerabilities can lead to firmware-
based rootkits, it is likely that at least some of the vulnerabilities found lead to firmware
compromise.
Costin, Zarras, and Francillon performed both static and dynamic analysis of embed-
ded web interfaces within the firmware. From static analysis, they found cross-site scripting
and file manipulation were the majority of the vulnerabilities. From dynamic analysis, they
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found a variety of vulnerabilities including command injection, cross-site scripting, and
cross-site request forgery [6, p. 8].
2.3.15 Countermeasures
The common countermeasure for embedded firmware is for the manufacturer to pro-
vide an update to the firmware. Costin, Zarras, and Francillon were not researching firmware
rootkits, but rather firmware vulnerabilities in general. It is unlikely that a single counter-
measure will apply to all firmware. However, there is a move to include TPM architecture
into Internet of Things devices [37].
2.3.16 Rootkit Detection Evolution
Traditional detection techniques include file integrity or rootkit signatures. These
techniques are not effective against rootkits that do not modify operating system data or
code [7, p. 296]. New tools such as Malware Analysis System for Hidden Knotty Anoma-
lies (MASHKA) described by Korkin and Nesterov can be used to detect kernel mode
rootkits [22]. Another architecture, Rootkit Guard relies on TPM, TrustedGRUB, and
SELinux to create a rootkit resilient environment [39]. While evolution of detection and
mitigation techniques is taking place with these tools, they are not applied specifically to
firmware rootkits. This is an area for further exploration and examination.
2.4 A Rootkit Detection Framework
One of the main techniques to detect a rootkit is not relying on the suspect system to
provide answers. In another words, the system can’t be expected to give a truthful answer
about it’s security state. To work around this, a virtualization tool such as QEMU can be
used to emulate the system. In this way QEMU can be instrumented to provide data such
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as executed instructions and register values.
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Methods: Analyzing OpenWrt Running
in QEMU
3.1 A Brief Overview
In our research, we built an OpenWrt system and installed MITM Proxy. We used
QEMU to emulate the system, along with a client and server. Options within QEMU allow
for logging executed instructions, i.e. -d in asm. This is a key importance of the system
we built. The primary importance is gathering information about the system from outside
the system. In other words QEMU is a trusted system and I expect that QEMU reliably
provides truthful data about the embedded firmware it emulates.
3.2 Motivation to use MITMProxy
Our initial research showed we could use squid proxy [34] along with c-icap [36]
to perform HTTP injection. The ICAP protocol is documented in RFC 3507 [9]. After
some trial and error, it is clear that this method is complex and requires additional devices.
For this research project, we decided it is best to keep the architecture as simple as possible.
For that reason, an alternative solution, MITM Proxy is used.
MITM Proxy has several benefits. First it is an all Python implementation. Although
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it does have several prerequisites outside of Python, the code to run MITM Proxy is Python
and it is installed using the PIP Python package manager. OpenWrt is capable of running
Python 2 and Python 3. These options must be chosen during the build process.
3.3 System Architecture
The system consists of three primary devices: a router connecting a client and a server.
Each of these three devices is an instance of OpenWrt that is built to run in QEMU. Below
is a diagram of the network. The server contains a uhttpd service to host a simple web
page. The client uses wget as a web client.
Figure 3.1: Simplified Architecture
We created a virtual bridge called ”lan-bridge” to connect the client and router. We
created another bridge called ”wan-bridge” to connect the router and server. Both of these
bridges are created via bridge-utils in an Ubuntu 18.04 host. Each of the three device
has an interface connected to one of the two virtual bridges. A more accurate diagram is
below in 3.3.
In the following sections, each component and it’s specifications are outlined. The
components outlined are the OpenWrt router containing the MITMProxy software, the
client containing the wget utility, the server containing the uhttpd server utility, the
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Figure 3.2: Complete architecutre
network bridges and how they are created, the network interfaces created for each of the
devices, and finally, the MTIMProxy software and it’s requirements.
3.3.1 OpenWrt Router
According to https://openwrt.org, OpenWrt is a ”Linux operating system tar-
geting embedded devices.” We chose to use OpenWrt as an embedded system because it
works readily as a router, it uses a standard Linux kernel, and allows for customization.
The OpenWrt router is built with very few configuration changes from the default. The
default configuration is shared among the router, client, and server. The primary changes
are made to the router to accommodate MITMProxy requirements. We made modifications
to include various prerequisite Python 3 libraries, use the glibc library instead of musl
library, storage considerations, and a network script (outlined in the networking section). In
addition, the uhttpd and wget utilities are selected in the configuration for the client and
server. These utilities are not used on the router. These specific requirements will be out-
lined in detail below. It is worth noting here that while the default configuration functions
at a basic level, the configuration requirements for MITMProxy are challenging to config-
ure properly. The network script for the router is built into the image in the appropriate
location /etc/config/network.
The slightly abridged configuration used to build OpenWrt is shown in appendix D.
The configuration shown includes only enabled options. Additionally, the network config-
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uration used for the router, server and client are shown in appendix E.
3.3.2 Client
The client is an instance of an OpenWrt. It is only connected to one network therefore
routing function is effectively nullified. The client contains the same default configura-
tion as the router. The client network script is described below in the networking section.
The client relies on the wget utility. The client doesn’t require any additional config-
uration changes. The network script is built into the image in the appropriate location
/etc/config/network.
3.3.3 Server
The server is also an instance of OpenWrt. It only connects directly to the router and
has no need for routing outside of the single network connection. The server relies on the
uhttpd web server component. It contains a simple web page. The network script for the
server is built into the image in the appropriate location /etc/config/network.
3.4 Networking in OpenWrt
The first step to networking in QEMU is creating a virtual switch (bridge). Each of
the three devices has a virtual interface connected to one of two virtual bridges. The first
bridge is designated for network A. The second bridge is designated for network B.
3.4.1 How a Network Router Works
In order for devices on different networks to communicate a router must ”route” traffic
between the networks. The router does this via a routing table. The routing table contains
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the network ID and the exit interface and/or the next hop interface. The exit interface
is the network interface the traffic should go to if it is headed toward the corresponding
network ID. The next hop interface is the IP address of the next ”hop” on the path to the
traffic’s destination. Traffic can get to this information using a Layer 2 OSI protocol such
as Ethernet. In this simple case the router will have only a few entries in the routing table.
3.4.2 Network Bridges, Interfaces, and Configuration
We created all of the network bridges and interfaces on an Ubuntu 18.04 host system
with the appropriate QEMU emulation tools installed. We created two network bridges
using brctl. One bridge is designated to connect the client and router and another bridge
is designated to connect the server and router. We used tunctl to create four interfaces.
The client and server each have one interface and the router has two interfaces – one for
each network. All of these items are documented in a bash script in appendix F.
We added a third virtual interface to the router OpenWrt instance to communicate with
the Internet. We only did this to install MITMProxy. It is possible to install MITMProxy
without direct Internet access, but it is more cumbersome to do so. Once the proxy software
is installed, the third interface may be removed.
Network Configuration
We created two networks connected by a router as shown below in figure 3.3
Neither the server nor client need to perform any additional routing functions. The
router will contain a routing table and manage sending traffic from one network to another.
This requires no additional configuration in OpenWrt.
The complete network configuration scripts are included in appendix E. Note in the
router configuration, the Internet interface is used to install MITM Proxy and afterward it
can be disabled during HTTP injection.
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Figure 3.3: Client and server networks connected by a router
3.5 Building Openwrt
Openwrt relies on the Kbuild system. This is the same system the Linux kernel relies
on. There are some customization to the build system for Openwrt but those are mostly
not necessary for this work. Generally, building OpenWrt is a straightforward process that
is mostly well documented. For this specific application there are a number of specific
configuration pieces documented in the following sections.
3.5.1 Prerequsites for MITM Proxy
MITM Proxy is described as a ”swiss-army knife for debugging, testing, privacy mea-
surements, and penetration testing” [5]. As it stands, there is no simple way to install
MITM Proxy into OpenWrt. MITM Proxy is implemented in pure Python and can be in-
stalled using package installer for Python (PIP). This greatly simplifies the process, but
there are still a number of dependencies. A rough outline of the dependency tree is shown
below in 3.4. In addition there are sub dependencies which are detailed below.
We identified two significant hurdles to installation: OpenWrt must be built with
glibc as opposed to musl and glibc must be built within OpenWrt for a UTF-8 con-
sole environment. The UTF-8 console environment is required for the HTML text encod-
ing. The locale binary allows the selection of UTF-8 in the console environment. To
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Figure 3.4: Dependency Overview
obtain the locale binary we need to compile glibc.
The build process is involved and requires prerequisites to MITM Proxy in addition to
customization of the resultant OpenWrt system image. The first step to get MITM Proxy
installed in OpenWrt is selecting the Python prerequisites. MITM Proxy requires little
outside of the Python prerequisites and the locale binary to meet the UTF-8 console
environment requirement. The locale binary is the real challenge. The locale binary
is found in glibc. In turn, glibc requires bison to build within a running OpenWrt
instance. In turn, building bison required the built-in gcc compiler to be modified to
include the gcc-ar utility.
The first task is to build OpenWrt with appropriate Python prerequisites to support
MITM Proxy. This process is moderately unstable and requires some effort. The best
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approach is to build OpenWrt incrementally with small changes. However, this is also the
most time consuming. Once prerequisites are identified it is a bit quicker, though a build
takes several hours.
The following is a list of Python prerequisites for MITM Proxy. Many of these pre-






















Building glibc requires a gcc compiler and MITM Proxy pre-requisite crypt-
opgraphy requires modifications to the default gcc in OpenWrt. In a traditional Linux
installation this is trivial. In fact, OpenWrt already has this option built-in. Unfortunately,
the OpenWrt built-in gcc is artificially limited and does not include all of the important
utilities of gcc necessary such as gcc-ar, an archival utility required to build glibc.
Modifying the gcc compiler within OpenWrt is not overly challenging. It consists of
modifying the existing Makefile for gcc and modifying to include ar. The modified
Makefile is listed in appendix A.
After modifying the gcc Makefile, additional modifications to the gcc source
code are necessary. gcc versions 2.26 and later do not include struct ucontext [32].
The offending code is located in openwrt/build dir/target-x86 64 glibc/gcc-
-5.4.0/x86 64-openwrt-linux-gnu/libgcc/md-unwind-support.h at ap-
proximately lines 61 and 144. The full modified code for md-unwind-support.h is
located in appendix B.
After building OpenWrt, build glibc on the resultant Linux based router. The
fastest way is to include the source in the initial build so that building can take place right
away. Building glibc, follows the traditional pattern of configure, make, and make
install commands. However, to build glibc, the prerequisite of bison must be built
and installed first. We also made a symlink to the appropriate location to /usr/bin/bison.
Once glibc is built, MITM Proxy can be installed into OpenWrt through PIP.
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Results
4.1 MITM Proxy Configuration
Using MITMProxy requires some configuration and a good understanding of how
network traffic will flow. In this case, there is a client and server connected by a router.
Traffic flows over the router where MITMProxy is installed and should be modified by
the router directly. To make this work, the traffic must be redirected to the proxy prior
to the routing function. In other words, before traffic is routed at OSI layer 3 it must be
intercepted and sent to the proxy. This is done using iptables.
iptables -t nat -A PREROUTING -i eth0 -p tcp --dport 80 -j
REDIRECT --to-port 8080
The statement above means that traffic coming into the routers interface named eth0
using the TCP protocol port 80 will be redirected to port 8080. Port 8080 is the port that
MITMProxy listens on. This causes the traffic to be captured (but not intercept)1 by the
proxy then sent on to the destination. Before traffic can be intercepted an intercept filter
must be created. The filter text in MITM Proxy is q. Once traffic is intercepted by MITM
Proxy, the request can be modified.
1MITMProxy distinguishes between captured traffic and intercepted traffic. Captured traffic cannot be
modified and sent on to the destination, whereas intercepted traffic is modifiable.
32
4.2 Performing HTML Injection with MITMProxy on Open-
Wrt
Once an OpenWrt router is built successfully and MITMProxy is installed. It is pos-
sible to perform a complete man-in-the-middle injection of HTML. Below is a diagram of
the network. The client and server are actually instances of OpenWrt. The server contains
a uhttpd service to host a simple web page. The client uses wget as a web client.
Figure 4.1: Simplified Architecture
The scenario has the following steps:
1. The client requests the web page. At this point the wget application creates a request
and sends the request down the network stack (OSI model). The traffic is sent out
over the wire. In this case the wire is a virtual switch created with bridge-utils.
The intercepted page is shown in 4.2
2. The router receives the traffic on the interfaces connected to the client network. Be-
fore the traffic is routed it is intercepted by the MITMProxy. MITMProxy reads the
request and a response is crafted manually or dynamically using a script. MITM-
Proxy crafts the response and provides the response directly to the router. The mod-
ified response is shown below in 4.2.
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3. The router provides a response to the client’s request. The router forwards the modi-
fied request to the client.
4. The client receives the request. The client has no way to know or detect that the
router did all of the work of providing the HTTP response. The received page is
shown in 4.2.
Figure 4.2: Intercepted traffic in MITMProxy
The scenario can be altered to allow MITMProxy to modify the original server page.
4.3 Generated Assembly QEMU
QEMU works by translating target instructions to host instructions. When a system
like OpenWrt is emulated in QEMU it the instructions from the target OpenWrt system get
translated to something the host can execute. This architecture has the ability to handle
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Figure 4.3: Modified response in MITMProxy
instruction sets other than the native host operating system i.e. the host can be x86 64
and the target can be MIPS. This architecture also provides an opportunity for QEMU to
optimize instructions.
QEMU allows for these instructions to be logged both before and after the translation
occurs along with additional options. The options in QEMU are in asm and out asm.
With these options enabled the output of the OpenWrt boot process is logged. An example
log is shown in figure 4.5. These instructions ultimately align to what is in the bzImage
file. bzImage is a compressed Linux kernel with some additional boot information added.
With just a little analysis of the QEMU log and the objdump of bzImage, the instruction
alignment is confirmed.
The figure 4.6 shows the objdump. The first instruction in the <.setup> is jmp
0x268. Examining the QEMU log in figure 4.7 shows that the jmp 0x268 instruction
is at line 20614. The next instruction in the QEMU log is movw %ds, %ax. The corre-
sponding instruction in the objdump log is at line 267. Note that the instructions in the
objdump log are not identical to the instructions shown in the QEMU log. The easiest
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Figure 4.4: The client shows the modified response
way to compare these logs is using the middle column which represents machine code.
The line numbers of the objdump are incremented by the number of bytes in the machine
code starting at line 200. On line 267 that shows the current instruction, skip the first byte
which is 8c d8. From this point instruction alignment is straight forward as there are no
jmp instructions that will skip a series of bytes.
4.4 QEMU Tracing
Another way to trace execution in QEMU is by a feature called QEMU Tracing. This
function works at a slightly higher level than the lower level instruction level logging dis-
cussed previously. This method works with a trace-events file provided in the QEMU
source doe. This is simply a list of all of the function headers available for tracing. Addi-
tional custom functions can be written. The second file involved is the custom events file
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Figure 4.5: OpenWrt boot instructions captured via QEMU with the in asm option
that contains a matching function to trace. It works as a filter for the trace-events file but it
only contains the name of the function [15].
This tracing methodology was an evolution of using other mechanisms such as GDB
and LTTng that rely on system calls which may give unreliable information on a compro-
mised system. It is more complex than the method above but it does provide a higher level
logging which may be useful as data is moving through a network stack.
4.5 A Brief Exploration of Diamorphine
Diamorphine is an open source example of a kernel rootkit [29]. Diamorphine is a
is a simple rootkit that hides processes in the system. The ps tool in Linux shows the
currently running processes. Diamorphine can effectively remove process from that results
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Figure 4.6: Objdump of bzImage
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Figure 4.7: QEMU log aligned with objdump
list. It works by sending a special signal numbered 31 to the process. Once that is done,
the process is hidden from the ps results.
During this research project, we explored using Diamorphine and found it integrates
readily with OpenWrt. As an example for discussion, the Diamorphine rootkit behavior
should be detectable with QEMU tracing.
We predict, based on our existing observations that Diamorphine’s behavior will ap-
pear in at least three places: 1) the request for ps results will demonstrate the hiding
behavior, 2) the act of hiding the process with the kill command will reveal the behavior,
and 3) the hidden process will execute additional instructions that may be detectable when
compared to a system with a system without the rootkit.
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Conclusions
5.1 Tracing HTTP Injection In OpenWrt
In this research we show how to perform instruction level tracing on an OpenWRT
router running in QEMU. We built a framework for HTTP injection in OpenWrt. Through
the steps identified in previous sections and outlined below, we show tracing HTTP in-
jection in OpenWrt is possible though not trivial. We document the steps of building an
instance of OpenWRT that includes the MITM Proxy software necessary to perform HTTP
injection. We further discuss the possibility of using the Diamorphine rootkit within Open-
Wrt.
The first step to building an OpenWrt framework for HTTP injection is to identify
and install Python prerequisites for MITM Proxy. The Python prerequisites are moderately
involved and require multiple prerequisites themselves. Additionally, the Python cryptog-
raphy library requires gcc-ar. To meet this requirement the Makefile for gcc.
Next, modifications to gcc source code are required due to code changes in more re-
cent versions of gcc. The changes are made in the md-unwind-support.h file. Once
these changes are made, OpenWrt compiles with the prerequisites necessary for MITM
Proxy.
We traced the execution of OpenWrt in QEMU with the in asm option. We were
able to clearly identify instruction in the Linux kernel with the bzImage file produced by
previous steps. We have demonstrated it is possible to trace instructions reliably in a com-
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promised embedded system. We document system limitation and clear path forward for
future research below.
5.2 Limitations
We believe the most challenging limitation to this system is that it’s difficult to build.
During the build process we found a number of build errors. Some were and easy to fix,
while others took many days of effort to get past. What we learned through this experience
is that the build process is fragile. It breaks easily with new versions of software and some-
times for reasons that were unclear to us. OpenWrt uses a standard Kconfig build system
but there are many complex parts in OpenWrt and they can conflict with one another.
Another limitation to this system is that it’s not easy to use. There is no trivial way
to run the OpenWrt router and the clients. We wrote shell scripts included in the appendix
to run this system. Once the system is running, there are still a number of steps to make
MITM proxy operate. It relies on ip-tables along with creating filters within the proxy.
None of these steps individually are difficult, but they need to be performed reliably and in
order each time.
This system currently only works with OpenWrt firmware and requires a workstation
with a significant amount of memory and storage for virtual machines. This could be
reduced to more reasonable levels than what we used for this research. However, during
experimentation with logging instructions in QEMU, we found writing the log file often
stalled and the whole system moved slowly if at all. We suspect that a better logging
mechanism to a remote machine may resolve this issue. Though it is not clear if this kind
of mechanism is possible without significant modifications to QEMU source code.
The OpenWrt system we built provides a pragmatic approach to gathering instructions
and behavioral data. We assumed that QEMU is a trusted piece of software. While we
believe this assumption is reasonable, it is an assumption none the less. To verify this,
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QEMU should be validated using formal methods.
5.3 Recommendations for Future Work
In our research we built a framework to analyze instruction level tracing of an em-
bedded system using QEMU. We did not analyze all generated data as this is a significant
undertaking in itself. We believe the first task in future work is to analyze the data output by
the QEMU trace and identify the actions taken by MITM Proxy and/or Diamorphine. The
existing research covering the exact behaviors of rootkits should be analyzed and distilled
to a pattern that can be used in the framework that we have built. We believe creating a tax-
onomy of rootkit behavior and documenting that at the instruction level will prove useful
in tracing and identifying those behaviors on suspect systems.
We believe there are several areas for interesting future work. The most significant
area for future work is in integrating this system into another system such as Firmadyne.
Firmadyne offers a number of framework pieces that could be leveraged to further analyze
firmware. We believe that the Firmadyne can be modified uses an actual kernel to emulate
the file system of firmware instead of emulating the file system as it does currently. One
major technical hurdle with emulating the actual kernel is in device drivers. A possibility
to overcome this is by building the hardware emulation into QEMU. That process is likely
to be rather involved.
If Firmwadyne is successfully modified to emulate a kernel as described in this re-
search, it could reveal malicious behavior in firmware provided by manufacturers. The
existing Firmadyne framework focuses on finding vulnerabilities in the web interfaces and
other network ingress/egress of device firmware. With the addition of kernel emulation this
system could be used forensically to detect exploited firmware that may have rootkits or
other malware installed.
The OpenWrt website provides a table of hardware that is supported. Further, the
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details of the hardware (versions, various parameters, etc.) are available [30]. We believe
using a variety of reverse engineering tools and techniques such as binwalk, objdump, dtc,
etc. a more complete picture of device hardware can be built. QEMU is extensible and can
emulate additional hardware. For example there is a QEMU PCI educational device in the
QEMU source code. Creating a library of device drivers this way should allow for more
complete emulation.
We believe there is a possibility of integrating hardware into QEMU by creating more
general templates for each class of hardware. For example, wireless network cards are
likely to share a number of similarities. These could be integrated into an extensible driver
collection via a markup language like JSON or XML. The drivers could be read dynam-
ically into QEMU allowing for a code base that doesn’t need to be recompiled for each
hardware addition. Thus a database of drivers can be generated readily.
We identified a discrepancy in the output of logged instructions between QEMU and
the objdump of bzImage. We believe there is a good explanation for this, but we didn’t
investigate fully in this research. We relied on the hexadecimal machine code that was a
perfect match. We also note that future work should include a better understanding of the
boot sequence and associated boot instructions.
Lastly, we think refining the build process is a reasonable undertaking. Building
MITM Proxy into OpenWrt with all of the prerequisites will allow for a more efficient
build process. Kconfig allows for these modifications, but we did not refine the process.
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2 # Copyright (C) 2008 OpenWrt.org
3 #
4 # This is free software, licensed under the GNU General Public License v2.



















24 PKGVERSION=OpenWrt GCC $(PKG_VERSION)
25 TARGET_CPPFLAGS += -D_GLIBCXX_INCLUDE_NEXT_C_HEADERS
26


















45 MAINTAINER:=Noble Pepper <gccmaintain@noblepepper.com>





































82 # we have to download and unpack additional stuff before patching
83 tar -C $(PKG_BUILD_DIR) -xvjf $(DL_DIR)/$(GMPSRC).tar.bz2
84 ln -sf $(PKG_BUILD_DIR)/$(GMPSRC) $(PKG_BUILD_DIR)/gmp
85 tar -C $(PKG_BUILD_DIR) -xvzf $(DL_DIR)/$(MPCSRC).tar.gz
86 ln -sf $(PKG_BUILD_DIR)/$(MPCSRC) $(PKG_BUILD_DIR)/mpc
87 tar -C $(PKG_BUILD_DIR) -xvjf $(DL_DIR)/$(MPFRSRC).tar.bz2
88 ln -sf $(PKG_BUILD_DIR)/$(MPFRSRC) $(PKG_BUILD_DIR)/mpfr
89 $(Build/Patch)
90 # poor man’s fix for ‘none-openwrt-linux’ not recognized when building with musl
91 cp $(PKG_BUILD_DIR)/config.sub $(PKG_BUILD_DIR)/mpfr/
92 cp $(PKG_BUILD_DIR)/config.sub $(PKG_BUILD_DIR)/gmp/
93 cp $(PKG_BUILD_DIR)/config.sub $(PKG_BUILD_DIR)/mpc/
94 endef
95
96 TARGET_CXX += -std=gnu++03











































138 export SHELL="$(BASH)"; $(MAKE_VARS) $(MAKE) -C $(PKG_BUILD_DIR) \

















155 $(INSTALL_DIR) $(1)/usr/bin $(1)/usr/lib $(1)/usr/lib/$(PKG_NAME)/$(
REAL_GNU_TARGET_NAME)/$(PKG_VERSION)
156 cp -ar $(PKG_INSTALL_DIR)/usr/include $(1)/usr
157 cp -a $(PKG_INSTALL_DIR)/usr/bin/{$(REAL_GNU_TARGET_NAME)-{g++,gcc,gcc-ar},cpp
,gcov} $(1)/usr/bin
158 ln -s $(REAL_GNU_TARGET_NAME)-g++ $(1)/usr/bin/c++
159 ln -s $(REAL_GNU_TARGET_NAME)-g++ $(1)/usr/bin/g++
160 ln -s $(REAL_GNU_TARGET_NAME)-g++ $(1)/usr/bin/$(REAL_GNU_TARGET_NAME)-c++
161 ln -s $(REAL_GNU_TARGET_NAME)-gcc $(1)/usr/bin/gcc
162 ln -s $(REAL_GNU_TARGET_NAME)-gcc $(1)/usr/bin/$(REAL_GNU_TARGET_NAME)-gcc-$(
PKG_VERSION)
163 ln -s $(REAL_GNU_TARGET_NAME)-gcc-ar $(1)/usr/bin/gcc-ar
164 cp -ar $(PKG_INSTALL_DIR)/usr/lib/gcc $(1)/usr/lib
165 cp -ar $(TOOLCHAIN_DIR)/include $(1)/usr
166 cp -a $(TOOLCHAIN_DIR)/lib/*.{o,so*} $(1)/usr/lib/$(PKG_NAME)/$(
REAL_GNU_TARGET_NAME)/$(PKG_VERSION)
167 cp -a $(TOOLCHAIN_DIR)/lib/*nonshared*.a $(1)/usr/lib/$(PKG_NAME)/$(
REAL_GNU_TARGET_NAME)/$(PKG_VERSION)
168 cp -a $(TOOLCHAIN_DIR)/lib/libm.a $(1)/usr/lib/$(PKG_NAME)/$(
REAL_GNU_TARGET_NAME)/$(PKG_VERSION)
169 rm -f $(1)/usr/lib/$(PKG_NAME)/$(REAL_GNU_TARGET_NAME)/$(PKG_VERSION)/libgo*
170 rm -f $(1)/usr/lib/$(PKG_NAME)/$(REAL_GNU_TARGET_NAME)/$(PKG_VERSION)/libcc1*
171 echo ’#!/bin/sh’ > $(1)/usr/bin/gcc_env.sh
172 echo ’export LDFLAGS=$(ENVLDFLAGS)’ >> $(1)/usr/bin/gcc_env.sh
173 echo ’export CFLAGS=$(ENVCFLAGS)’ >> $(1)/usr/bin/gcc_env.sh
174 chmod +x $(1)/usr/bin/gcc_env.sh
175 endef
176




1 /* DWARF2 EH unwinding support for AMD x86-64 and x86.
2 Copyright (C) 2004-2015 Free Software Foundation, Inc.
3
4 This file is part of GCC.
5
6 GCC is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
7 it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
8 the Free Software Foundation; either version 3, or (at your option)
9 any later version.
10
11 GCC is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
12 but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
13 MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the
14 GNU General Public License for more details.
15
16 Under Section 7 of GPL version 3, you are granted additional
17 permissions described in the GCC Runtime Library Exception, version
18 3.1, as published by the Free Software Foundation.
19
20 You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License and
21 a copy of the GCC Runtime Library Exception along with this program;
22 see the files COPYING3 and COPYING.RUNTIME respectively. If not, see
23 <http://www.gnu.org/licenses/>. */
24
25 /* Do code reading to identify a signal frame, and set the frame
26 state data appropriately. See unwind-dw2.c for the structs.




31 /* There’s no sys/ucontext.h for glibc 2.0, so no
32 signal-turned-exceptions for them. There’s also no configure-run for
33 the target, so we can’t check on (e.g.) HAVE_SYS_UCONTEXT_H. Using the
34 target libc version macro should be enough. */







42 #define MD_FALLBACK_FRAME_STATE_FOR x86_64_fallback_frame_state
43
44 static _Unwind_Reason_Code
45 x86_64_fallback_frame_state (struct _Unwind_Context *context,
46 _Unwind_FrameState *fs)
47 {
48 unsigned char *pc = context->ra;
49 struct sigcontext *sc;
50 long new_cfa;
51
52 /* movq $__NR_rt_sigreturn, %rax ; syscall. */
53 #ifdef __LP64__
54 #define RT_SIGRETURN_SYSCALL 0x050f0000000fc0c7ULL
55 #else
56 #define RT_SIGRETURN_SYSCALL 0x050f40000201c0c7ULL
57 #endif
58 if (*(unsigned char *)(pc+0) == 0x48
52
59 && *(unsigned long long *)(pc+1) == RT_SIGRETURN_SYSCALL)
60 {
61 //struct ucontext *uc_ = context->cfa;
62 ucontext_t *uc_ = context->cfa;
63 /* The void * cast is necessary to avoid an aliasing warning.
64 The aliasing warning is correct, but should not be a problem
65 because it does not alias anything. */





71 new_cfa = sc->rsp;
72 fs->regs.cfa_how = CFA_REG_OFFSET;
73 /* Register 7 is rsp */
74 fs->regs.cfa_reg = 7;
75 fs->regs.cfa_offset = new_cfa - (long) context->cfa;
76
77 /* The SVR4 register numbering macros aren’t usable in libgcc. */
78 fs->regs.reg[0].how = REG_SAVED_OFFSET;
79 fs->regs.reg[0].loc.offset = (long)&sc->rax - new_cfa;
80 fs->regs.reg[1].how = REG_SAVED_OFFSET;
81 fs->regs.reg[1].loc.offset = (long)&sc->rdx - new_cfa;
82 fs->regs.reg[2].how = REG_SAVED_OFFSET;
83 fs->regs.reg[2].loc.offset = (long)&sc->rcx - new_cfa;
84 fs->regs.reg[3].how = REG_SAVED_OFFSET;
85 fs->regs.reg[3].loc.offset = (long)&sc->rbx - new_cfa;
86 fs->regs.reg[4].how = REG_SAVED_OFFSET;
87 fs->regs.reg[4].loc.offset = (long)&sc->rsi - new_cfa;
88 fs->regs.reg[5].how = REG_SAVED_OFFSET;
89 fs->regs.reg[5].loc.offset = (long)&sc->rdi - new_cfa;
90 fs->regs.reg[6].how = REG_SAVED_OFFSET;
91 fs->regs.reg[6].loc.offset = (long)&sc->rbp - new_cfa;
92 fs->regs.reg[8].how = REG_SAVED_OFFSET;
93 fs->regs.reg[8].loc.offset = (long)&sc->r8 - new_cfa;
94 fs->regs.reg[9].how = REG_SAVED_OFFSET;
95 fs->regs.reg[9].loc.offset = (long)&sc->r9 - new_cfa;
96 fs->regs.reg[10].how = REG_SAVED_OFFSET;
97 fs->regs.reg[10].loc.offset = (long)&sc->r10 - new_cfa;
98 fs->regs.reg[11].how = REG_SAVED_OFFSET;
99 fs->regs.reg[11].loc.offset = (long)&sc->r11 - new_cfa;
100 fs->regs.reg[12].how = REG_SAVED_OFFSET;
101 fs->regs.reg[12].loc.offset = (long)&sc->r12 - new_cfa;
102 fs->regs.reg[13].how = REG_SAVED_OFFSET;
103 fs->regs.reg[13].loc.offset = (long)&sc->r13 - new_cfa;
104 fs->regs.reg[14].how = REG_SAVED_OFFSET;
105 fs->regs.reg[14].loc.offset = (long)&sc->r14 - new_cfa;
106 fs->regs.reg[15].how = REG_SAVED_OFFSET;
107 fs->regs.reg[15].loc.offset = (long)&sc->r15 - new_cfa;
108 fs->regs.reg[16].how = REG_SAVED_OFFSET;
109 fs->regs.reg[16].loc.offset = (long)&sc->rip - new_cfa;
110 fs->retaddr_column = 16;




115 #else /* ifdef __x86_64__ */
116
117 #define MD_FALLBACK_FRAME_STATE_FOR x86_fallback_frame_state
118
119 static _Unwind_Reason_Code
120 x86_fallback_frame_state (struct _Unwind_Context *context,
121 _Unwind_FrameState *fs)
122 {
123 unsigned char *pc = context->ra;
124 struct sigcontext *sc;
125 long new_cfa;
126
127 /* popl %eax ; movl $__NR_sigreturn,%eax ; int $0x80 */
128 if (*(unsigned short *)(pc+0) == 0xb858
129 && *(unsigned int *)(pc+2) == 119
130 && *(unsigned short *)(pc+6) == 0x80cd)
131 sc = context->cfa + 4;
53
132 /* movl $__NR_rt_sigreturn,%eax ; int $0x80 */
133 else if (*(unsigned char *)(pc+0) == 0xb8
134 && *(unsigned int *)(pc+1) == 173
135 && *(unsigned short *)(pc+5) == 0x80cd)
136 {





142 //struct ucontext uc;
143 ucontext_t uc;
144 } *rt_ = context->cfa;
145 /* The void * cast is necessary to avoid an aliasing warning.
146 The aliasing warning is correct, but should not be a problem
147 because it does not alias anything. */





153 new_cfa = sc->esp;
154 fs->regs.cfa_how = CFA_REG_OFFSET;
155 fs->regs.cfa_reg = 4;
156 fs->regs.cfa_offset = new_cfa - (long) context->cfa;
157
158 /* The SVR4 register numbering macros aren’t usable in libgcc. */
159 fs->regs.reg[0].how = REG_SAVED_OFFSET;
160 fs->regs.reg[0].loc.offset = (long)&sc->eax - new_cfa;
161 fs->regs.reg[3].how = REG_SAVED_OFFSET;
162 fs->regs.reg[3].loc.offset = (long)&sc->ebx - new_cfa;
163 fs->regs.reg[1].how = REG_SAVED_OFFSET;
164 fs->regs.reg[1].loc.offset = (long)&sc->ecx - new_cfa;
165 fs->regs.reg[2].how = REG_SAVED_OFFSET;
166 fs->regs.reg[2].loc.offset = (long)&sc->edx - new_cfa;
167 fs->regs.reg[6].how = REG_SAVED_OFFSET;
168 fs->regs.reg[6].loc.offset = (long)&sc->esi - new_cfa;
169 fs->regs.reg[7].how = REG_SAVED_OFFSET;
170 fs->regs.reg[7].loc.offset = (long)&sc->edi - new_cfa;
171 fs->regs.reg[5].how = REG_SAVED_OFFSET;
172 fs->regs.reg[5].loc.offset = (long)&sc->ebp - new_cfa;
173 fs->regs.reg[8].how = REG_SAVED_OFFSET;
174 fs->regs.reg[8].loc.offset = (long)&sc->eip - new_cfa;
175 fs->retaddr_column = 8;




180 #define MD_FROB_UPDATE_CONTEXT x86_frob_update_context
181
182 /* Fix up for kernels that have vDSO, but don’t have S flag in it. */
183
184 static void
185 x86_frob_update_context (struct _Unwind_Context *context,
186 _Unwind_FrameState *fs ATTRIBUTE_UNUSED)
187 {
188 unsigned char *pc = context->ra;
189
190 /* movl $__NR_rt_sigreturn,%eax ; {int $0x80 | syscall} */
191 if (*(unsigned char *)(pc+0) == 0xb8
192 && *(unsigned int *)(pc+1) == 173
193 && (*(unsigned short *)(pc+5) == 0x80cd
194 || *(unsigned short *)(pc+5) == 0x050f))
195 _Unwind_SetSignalFrame (context, 1);
196 }
197
198 #endif /* ifdef __x86_64__ */
199 #endif /* not glibc 2.0 */








The .config file is shown below. The unset symbols are omitted.
1 #
2 # Automatically generated file; DO NOT EDIT.








































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































579 # Kernel modules
580 #
581 #




























































































































































































































































































862 # 1. Collections
863 #
864 #





870 # 3. Applications
871 #
872 #
873 # 4. Themes
874 #
875 #
876 # 5. Protocols
877 #
878 #



























































1 config interface ’loopback’
2 option ifname ’lo’
3 option proto ’static’
4 option ipaddr ’127.0.0.1’
5 option netmask ’255.0.0.0’
6
7 config interface ’eth0’
8 option ifname ’eth0’
9 option proto ’static’
10 option ipaddr ’192.168.1.2’
11 option gateway ’192.168.1.1’
12 option netmask ’255.255.255.0’
13
14 config interface ’eth1’
15 option ifname ’eth1’
16 option proto ’dhcp’
E.2 Server
1 config interface ’loopback’
2 option ifname ’lo’
3 option proto ’static’
4 option ipaddr ’127.0.0.1’
5 option netmask ’255.0.0.0’
6
7 config interface ’lan’
8 option ifname ’eth0’
9 option proto ’static’
10 option ipaddr ’192.168.2.2’
11 option gateway ’192.168.2.1’
12 option netmask ’255.255.255.0’
E.3 Client
1 config interface ’loopback’
2 option ifname ’lo’
3 option proto ’static’
4 option ipaddr ’127.0.0.1’
5 option netmask ’255.0.0.0’
6
7 config interface ’lan’
8 option ifname ’eth0’
9 option proto ’static’
10 option ipaddr ’192.168.1.1’
73
11 option netmask ’255.255.255.0’
12
13 config interface ’wan’
14 option ifname ’eth1’
15 option proto ’static’
16 option ipaddr ’192.168.2.1’
17 option netmask ’255.255.255.0’
18
19 config interface ’eth2’
20 option ifname ’eth2’
21 option proto ’dhcp’
74
Network Scripts
1 sudo chgrp user /dev/net/tun
2 #use 660 for root only
3 #use 666 for non-root users
4 sudo chmod 666 /dev/net/tun
5
6 #create a bridge
7 sudo brctl addbr lan-bridge
8 #turn off spanning tree
9 sudo brctl stp lan-bridge off
10 #configure the IP address of the bridge
11 sudo ifconfig lan-bridge 192.168.1.254 netmask 255.255.255.0 up
12
13 #create a TAP interface for the router
14 sudo tunctl -u user -t lan-if
15 #bring up the interface
16 sudo ifconfig lan-if 0.0.0.0 promisc up
17 #add the interface the lan-bridge
18 sudo brctl addif lan-bridge lan-if
19
20 #create a TAP interface for the client
21 sudo tunctl -u user -t client-if
22 #bring up the interface
23 sudo ifconfig client-if 0.0.0.0 promisc up
24 #add the interface the lan-bridge
25 sudo brctl addif lan-bridge client-if
26
27 sudo brctl addbr wan-bridge
28 sudo brctl stp wan-bridge off
29 sudo ifconfig wan-bridge 192.168.2.254 netmask 255.255.255.0 up
30 sudo tunctl -u user -t wan-if
31 sudo ifconfig wan-if 0.0.0.0 -promisc up
32 sudo brctl addif wan-bridge wan-if
33
34 #create a TAP interface for the server
35 sudo tunctl -u user -t server-if
36 #bring up the interface
37 sudo ifconfig server-if 0.0.0.0 promisc up
38 #add the interface the lan-bridge
39 sudo brctl addif wan-bridge server-if
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